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10 July, 1924.

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Instructors' Summary of Military Articles April-June, 1924

CONTENTS

Digest of Selected Articles and Documents	3
Review of New Books Received in the Library	16
Documents Received in Instructors' File Room	26
New Books Received in Library	33
Magazines Received in Library	37
Important Articles of Military Interest that have Appeared in Magazines	39
Index to Selected Magazine Articles, Documents, and Books	. 42

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DIGEST OF SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS

THE MOBILE DIVISION OF THE FUTURE

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Anonymous. 10 pages. (British) Cavalry Journal, April, 1924, p. 155.

The article discusses the necessity of striking a balance between the maintenance of mobility of a cavalry division and the attachment of units of other arms such as tanks, armored cars and tractor drawn artillery which will increase the striking power of the division but which will reduce its mobility. It emphasizes the importance of the personality of the cavalry leader and recommends that he be sought amongst men who still find pleasure in galloping across country.

The most valuable part of the article is a discussion of the recent reorganization of the French cavalry and their doctrine for its use which may be summed up in the phrase: "The cavalry maneuvers on horse back and fights on foot."

The five French cavalry divisions, to be known as "light divisions," are to be part of the G. H. Q Reserve. They each consist of three brigades of cavalry of two regiments each, a cyclist group, including sixteen machine guns and three (58-mm.) mortars carried in trucks, two battalions of horse artillery, a group of thirty-seven armored cars, one squadron of amplanes, and various detachments of other arms.

One cavalry regiment is assigned to each corps as corps cavalry. This regiment is divided into three groups. The Corps reconnaissance group consists of regimental headquarters, two squadrons, one company of cyclists with machine guns and a platoon of motor machine guns. Each of the two infantry divisions of the corps is given a reconnaissance group consisting of one squadron, one company of cyclists and a platoon of motor machine guns. The corps reconnaissance group is used to reinforce the division groups, or if there is no army cavalry, may be employed for distant reconnaissance duty. The division group screens the division and is normally attached to the advance guard on the march.

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In addition to the above cavalry units, each infantry regiment is given a cavalry platoon for scouting and liaison duties.

S.K.

ANTI-TANK MINES IN MOBILE WARFARE

By Capt. & Bvt. Major R. H. Dewing, D. S. O., M. C. 6 pages. Royal Engineers Journal, March, 1924, p. 61.

The author divides artificial anti-tank obstacles into:

a. Some form of ditch impassable for tanks. If concealed, the ditch develops into a *tank trap*.

b. Some form of stockade. In order to stop tanks, the stockade must be of very strong construction and usually entails heavy concrete work.

c. Inundations.

d. Land mines.

. Of the above (a) and (b) both demand more time, labor and transportation than would be available in mobile warfare. Inundations are only possible where natural conditions are favorable. Land mines, therefore, are the only class of obstacles which the engineers might generally be able to provide.

Mines alone cannot provide efficient protection, and the framework of anti-tank defense under present conditions must be anti-tank artillery. Mine fields may prove as important an accessory to anti-tank guns however, as barbed wire is to machine guns.

For use in mobile warfare, mines should be light enough to be easily transportable in large numbers, safe to handle, quick to lay and easy to conceal; with enough explosive contents to break the tread of any tank passing over it.

The author assumes that mines weighing from ten to fifteen pounds each could be laid in normal ground by one man at the rate of one every five minutes; and that an effective mine field could be formed by two or three rows of such mines, with the mines two yards apart in each row.

Anti-tank mine fields should be sited on sections of a defensive front favorable to hostile tanks, and should be sited in conjunction with anti-tank guns. Areas likely to be subjected to friendly artillery concentrations are not suitable,

due to the possibility of detonating the mines by artillery fire. Lines on which it is probable that friendly tanks will counterattack must be left clear.

R. R. R.

THE INFLUENCE OF FAST-MOVING TANKS ON THE ENCOUNTER OF BATTLE

By Col. J. F. C. Fuller, D. S. O. 5 pages. Royal Tanks Corps Journal, March and April, 1924.

In the words of the author, the purpose of this article is "not to prove that the tactics and training made use of in our army are valueless or that existing weapons are useless, but that we are today living in a transitional period, in which changes are beginning to take form, changes which, I believe, must radically modify our military conceptions."

This theme is developed by consideration of an encounter battle between two continental nations—Red and Blue equally strong in infantry, cavalry, artillery, and tanks. The latter are capable of cross-country speed of 20 miles per hour and their action in the various phases of this battle is portrayed as supporting the conclusion that effective cooperation with tanks requires that both infantry and artillery must be endowed with mobility comparable to that of the tank, i.e., must be motorized. The organization of movement is presented as the basic problem. The article is written by a tank enthusiast and is frankly speculative but is of general interest. The problems it suggests are real ones; the solutions offered may not be the best but they do furnish a starting point for further study.

E. J. M.

LA LIAISON PAR LE BAS ENTRE L'INFANTERIE ET L'ATILLERIE AU COMBAT—(BASIC LIAISON BETWEEN INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY IN COMBAT)

By Lt. Col. C. Jeze. French text, 19 pages. Revue d'Artillerie, March, 1924, p. 243.

The author briefly discusses the failures, in the offensive, of the means of liaison between front line infantry units and their supporting artillery.

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He proposes the following method for securing quick support, based on the use of the infantry company identification panels in connection with the infantry combat plane:

1. The element which has been stopped (battalion or company) puts out its identification panels asking for fire of a certain width in its front.

2. The plane observes the signal and transmits to the supporting artillery the request and the coordinates of the point "A" at which the signal has been made.

3. The artillery opens fire at a range 400 meters greater \cdot than the range to point "A."

4. The infantry observes the fire and indicates to the plane its fall by means of its identification panels.

5. The plane transmits this sensing to the artillery; the artillery, on receiving the signal "fire adjusted," fires for effect.

6. When the infantry is satisfied with the preparation, it signals by means of its identification panels "cease firing," when the fire lifts, the infantry moves forward.

Each of these steps is elaborated in the text, and is illustrated by diagrams.

The proposed method is evidently intended to overcome the following:

a. Lack of radio at infantry battalion command posts;

b. Difficulty, in the offensive, of maintaining telephone communication below the regiment;

c. If radio is present at battalion command post (our case), the loss of time in getting communication (by runner) from the company to battalion command post;

d. Difficulty of airplane observer in determining what enemy resistance is holding up the infantry;

e. Difficulty of airplane observer in telling when the infantry is ready to move forward;

f. Excessive losses in runners and in large artillery liaison detachments.

P. V. K.

STUDIES ON FIELD FORTIFICATION

By Col. Normand (French Army). French text, 17 pages. Revue d'Infanterie, April, 1924, p. 454. (To be continued.)

This article, which is to be continued in a later issue of the above mentioned magazine, is written for the purpose of emphsizing the importance to infantry units of instruction in organization of the ground. Taking up, first, organization of the ground in contact with the enemy on an active front, the author illustrates the difficulty of securing a suitable organization for defense under such conditions by the experiences of a French infantry regiment during the World War.

This regiment, the 109th, belonged to a division ordered to take over from another division, a sector on the Verdun front, between Fort Douaumont, then in possession of the Germans, and Vaux, still held by the French.

Leaving Verdun on 4 March, 1916 at 5:45 PM, the regiment had to march eleven to twelve kilometers to reach its sector which adjoined Fort Douaumont, and complete the relief of the troops then occupying the sector by 11:00 PM. It appeared simple, but delays due to hostile fire, traffic congestion and difficult routes, prevented the complete occupation of the sector till 9:00 AM on the following morning, when it was finally occupied under cover of fog.

On reaching its sector the regiment found it had no trenches worthy of mention, no obstacle and no engineer materials, though some tools were available. The regiment deployed with two battalions, each of three companies and a machine gun company, in the front line, and the third battalion in regimental reserve.

The construction of a front line trench was at once begun, but due to the fog and lack of adequate ground reconnaissance, the line selected had the following defects: At the boundary between battalions the trenches failed to connect, and there the ends of the battalion trenches were one behind the other with a considerable distance between them. At numerous points it had a poor field of fire, and at certain points, due to the steep slopes in front, it could not be closely supported by artillery. These defects were partly compensated for by a disposition in depth, which for the front line battalions reached

five hundred meters, and for the regiment eight hundred meters. A heavy German attack launched about noon March 8, after a fourteen-hour intensive artillery preparation, captured part of the front line trench, but was stopped by what corresponds to the battalion reserve line, and a counterattack.

The author discusses how a better organization of the ground could have been secured in this instance. Assuming that work was begun at dark, he estimates that each front line battalion should construct one thousand meters of trench one meter deep the first night, consisting of five hundred meters front line trench, three hundred meters of second line trench and two hundred meters of approach trench. This work if laid out by tracing tape could be executed by the three companies of the battalion, since it would require about two meters per man.

The seond night he would deepen these trenches to one meter and thirty centimeters and place portable obstacles in front of the front line trench. Two companies could do this work while the third would be employed in constructing a trench on the battalion reserve line. Combat groups and machine guns would be definitely located, and trench mortars installed to cover dead spaces not reached by artillery.

On the following days engineer material could be brought up, with which to construct light shelters and commence the construction of deep underground shelters. The division engineers would undertake deep shelter construction on the battalion and regimental reserve lines.

R. R. R.

PRINCIPLES OF EVACUATION,—III. ARMY CORPS AND ARMY EVACUATION. IV. COMMUNICATIONS ZONE EVACUATION

By Lt. Col. T. L. Rhoads. 63 pages. *Military Surgeon*, April and May, 1924. (For previous instalments see February and March, 1924 numbers.)

1. These are a continuation of a series of articles by the same author. The third instalment covers the Corps and Army:

a. The effect of World War experience on our present organization.

b. The present organization, functions, and methods of operation of the medical service.

c. The duties of officers at medical headquarters.

2. The fourth instalment, dealing with the communication zone, covers:

a. A general discussion of the organization of the communications zone.

b. The plan of evacuation and hospitalization of the communications zone.

c. Factors determining the number and location of medical establishments, including those of the veterinary service.

d. Administration of sanitation.

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3. These articles are of special value to medical officers and, the last one especially, to other officers directly concerned in the preparation of plans for the employment of the medical service.

C. C. MeC.

THE PREPARATION FOR THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE WESTERN FRONT IN THE SPRING OF 1918

By General Surgeon Dr. Altgeld, Ret., German Army. 18 pages. Military Surgeon, May, 1924, p. 595.

1. The medical service of the German army received instructions in December, 1917, to make complete preparations for a great offensive in the west in the spring of 1918. To insure secrecy, it was directed that all orders and instructions of importance be transmitted orally.

2. The article covers in considerable detail the arrangements made for the care of sick and wounded, including collection at the front, hospitalization, transportation, medical supply and sanitation.

3. The preparations made at this time were very complete and were based on the very extensive studies before the war and on the best that had been learned from the experiences of the war. Points of general interest are:

a. The policy of the German Supreme Command in requiring the medical service to make these extensive plans so far in advance.

b. The presence of medical officers with the troops actually engaged in combat was found to be of the greatest possible

-9-

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usefulness in direct care of the wounded, in directing the movement of wounded, in furnishing information to medical units advancing from the rear, and in maintaining the morale of the troops.

c. The medical units pertaining to divisions were held at a minimum which was insufficient for the care of casualties resulting from an attack or other major action. A pool of these units was maintained in the corps and armies. This was employed to augment, relieve, or replace divisional units whenever needed. While the arrangement had advantages, "Organic correlation between the troops and these, to them, strange sanitary formations was often difficult of establishment, costing much time and labor."

d. A large number of slightly sick and slightly wounded were capable of walking or of being moved by improvised transportation to establishments arranged and conducted as convalescent hospitals.

e. The expectation of being able to utilize fully equipped enemy medical establishments in the rear of his trench systems was not realized.

f. The utilization of railways, light railways, and tramways in lieu of motor ambulances, the number of which was very limited.

g. The complete arrangements made for sanitation of areas, inspection of food producing establishments, protection of troops against disease and sanitary supervision of the civil population in occupied territory.

C. C. McC.

WHOLESALE DEMOLITION

By Col. G. C. Williams, C. M. G., D. S. O. 3 pages. Royal Engineers Journal, March, 1924, p. 25.

The author refers to demolitions executed by the Germans on the eastern front in October, 1914, on the western front in 1917, and again in 1918, to cover their withdrawals, and indicates the value of these measures in stopping pursuit. He shows that pursuit was practically stopped when a distance of 70 to 80 miles separated the fighting troops from their railheads.

-10-

He argues that wholesale demolition is a defessive measure to be made full use of when occasion demands, and points out the desirability of studying in peace-time by means of exercises and schemes, its employment in time of war.

R. R. R.

THE GERMAN 24TH DIVISION IN THE OFFENSIVE OF MARCH, 1918

Journal United Service Institute, May, 1924. 5 pages. (From an article in "Im Felde Unbesiegt," Vol. 2, by Maj. Holthausen, then commanding 2d Bn, 139th Inf. Reg.)

The author gives an account of the operations of the 24th German Division against the left wing of the British V Corps of the Third Army during March, 1918.

The article is well written and gives a good account (somewhat biased perhaps) of the movements and actions of the units of the 24th Division. Details of movements of individual companies in some of the battalions are discussed. No, map is furnished. The article is most interesting and instructive if studied with a good map.

- E. S.

THE ITALIAN CAVALRY AT VITTORIO-VENETO

By Lt. Colonel R. Prioux, French Army. 11 pages. Revue de Cavalerie, Janaury-February, 1924. Translated at G. S. S., see Instructors' File No. 320-BB.

An analysis, based on the report of the Italian High Command and a study by the Italian General Staff, which clearly indicates the important part played by an Italian cavalry corps of four divisions during the closing days of the war. While the references to the operations of the several divisions are not in sufficiently detailed form for the reader to follow the various maneuvers and engagements, they do show; that their work was of a brilliant character and greatly assisted in completely overcoming the enemy's resistance.

As soon as the break of the Austrian's front line was felt, squadrons were sent through for local exploitation. The 1st Cavalry Division, attached to the Eighth Army was also employed in local exploitation, and succeeded in gaining the bridges over the Livenza River before they could be destroyed by the enemy. By night of the 31 October—1 November, the

Italian High Command foresaw the decisive collapse of the enemy front and gave instructions for the pursuit. The 1st Cavalry Division was placed under the Cavalry Corps commander. The cavalry was to advance as soon as possible to the rear of the enemy lines of communication in order to stop their supplies; it was to reach the Isonzo before the enemy. The retreating enemy colums were to be dispersed and the crossings over the streams guarded until the arrival of the infantry.

In its operations the Cavalry Corps covered a frontage of about forty miles.

The following are among the more interesting accomplishments:

The 1st Cavalry Division surprised and captured the headquarters and a large part of the 34th Austrian Division, captured a corps commander, blocked the retreat and assisted in compelling the surrender of two infantry and one dismounted cavalry division after already having captured more than ten thousand prisoners and ninety-eight guns.

The 3d Cavalry Division upon reaching the Tagliamento River found the 44th Austrian Division, supported by twenty batteries, defending the opposite bank. By a surprise attack it pierced the enemy lines and fell upon the artillery, capturing more than three thousand prisoners.

The 4th Cavalry Division, on finding the crossings over the Tagliamento River destroyed in its front, detoured to the north, crossed the river and outflanked the 44th Austrian Division (which had been attacked that morning by the 3d Division) and assisted in its disarmament.

During the six days of operation, the divisions of the Cavalry Corps advanced from two hundred to two hundred and fifty kilometers.

B. L.

RAW MATERIALS AND FOODSTUFFS IN THE COMMERCIAL POLICIES OF NATIONS

By Wm. S. Culbertson. (Including 35 papers presented at a Conference.) 280 pages. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1924.

This volume consists of a collection of the addresses presented at the annual meeting of the American Academy of

Political and Social Science at Williamstown, Mass., in July and August, 1923. The conference was attended by representatives of the several governmental departments at Washington, a number of whom, including officers of the Army and Navy, presented papers.

The conference was not held primarily as an aid in solving problems concerning tendencies liable to produce war or concerning the supply and procurement of essential materials for war, but over half of the thirty-five papers presented bear directly on war plans, and valuable ideas can be obtained from most of the remainder.

The papers in the volume are too diverse and too extensive to attempt a complete review in the space available here. It suffices to say that it is of great value to and should be read by all officers interested in a study of the economic causes of war, the prevention of war, and the bearing of sources of raw materials on the preparations for war.

C. C. McC.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF RUSSIA, CONSIDERED RACIALLY

By Col. J. C. Brickenridge, U. S. M. C. 28 pages. Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1923.

After a brief analysis of the history of Russia, since the Eighth Century, its geography, and the racial characteristics of its people, conclusions are presented as to the probable future relations of these peoples with foreign countries. It is pointed out that those countries which seceded from Russia as a result of the World War are precisely the ones which Russia has been at such pains to amalgamate in the past; they are the border states; they control the mouths of rivers and the salt water ports. The following predictions as to future relations with foreign countries are made:

Great Britain:—Russia may be expected to clash with Great Britain over the Bosphorus, over political control in Persia, over trade and political control in territories contiguous to Northern India, and over an all-year port in China, at some distant date which cannot now be foreseen.

France:—Cordial relations may be expected to be resumed as soon as Russia evolves a reputable form of government.

-13-

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Germany:-The two countries will doubtless develop close commercial ties to their mutual benefit.

Turkey:—It is only a matter of time before Russia renews the old conflict for control of the Bosphorus, and to dominate in Asia Minor and Transcaucasia.

Japan:-There will be nothing beyond local discord for many years.

United States:-Peaceful.

Summary:—There is a probability of serious differences between Russia and Great Britain arising over the possession of trade routes to Asia.

It is only a matter of time before there will be hostilities with Turkey and certain of the Transcaucasian tribes, due to control of the Bosphorus and the routes to the Persian Gulf.

The most probable seat of immediate war, waged with all available power, lies in Poland and the small nations to the north, bordering on the Gulf of Finland. As Russia has rectified her boundaries and sought Balkan ports in the past, so will she do again in the future.

A. L. R.

THE BATTLES OF SALT, AMAN AND JORDAN FROM TURKISH SOURCES

By Skander Bey. 10 pages, 2 maps. Journal Royal United Service Institution, May, 1924. (To be continued.)

This is the first installment of a discussion of the above named battles. The author, in this article, discusses the preparations made by the Turkish forces along the Jordan, in March, 1918, to oppose the anticipated crossing of that stream by the British. A front of thirty to thirty-five kilometers was allotted to the 48th Turkish Division, which was much depleted. Two German battalions were assigned to this front but, due to lack of transportation and a paucity of roads, it required thirty days to concentrate these forces on the Jordan front. The division front was divided into two sectors and the Turkish commander claims that his total troops to protect this front consisted of two 4.7 field guns, one hundred and forty cavalry, sixteen machine guns and approximately two hundred and eighty infantry. The importance of the Jordan

-14---

lay in the fact that once it was crossed, the British could advance north in the valley of the Jordan and threaten the east flank of the 7th Turkish Army. A brief description of the action on 23-24 March, when the British crossed the Jordan, is given.

Part II discusses the battle of Tel-el-Namrin on 25 March and the subsequent retirement to Salt, 25-28 March. The article is well written and interesting, but has little value except to emphasize the necessity of ample road and railway facilities for troop concentrations. It is not recommended as a source for reference or for information as it contains nothing new.

E. S.